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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
CARDIAC CASES UNDER OKLAHOMA'S WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT -A REJECTION OF THE
USUAL EXERTION RULE
In the recent Oklahoma Supreme Court case of Ideal Ce-
ment Co. v. The Oklahoma State Industrial Court,1 the court
reversed an Industrial Court decision allowing death benefits
to the widow of an employee who suffered a fatal heart at-
tack while doing routine clean-up work for his employer. In
reversing the decision of the Industrial Court the Oklahoma
Supreme Court emphatically rejected a doctrine well estab-
lished in Oklahoma and in a majority of jurisdictions through-
out the country.2 This doctrine, commonly known as the usual
exertion rule, is a manifestation of the judicial feeling that
in heart attack cases considered under a workmen's compen-
sation act, the requisite causal connection between the in-
jury and the employment is established by a mere showing
that the employee was doing routine work in a usual fashion
while on the job. The public policy basis for the rule stems
from the difficulty in actually distinguishing the line be-
tween usual and unusual exertion and from the idea that
workmen's compensation statutes should be liberally constru-
ed in favor of the claimant.3 The Oklahoma court specifically
rejected this idea by holding that, absent unusual strain or
exertion, the necessary causal connection could not be estab-
blished. In Ideal Cement, the deceased died of heart failure on
the day after he had experienced chest pains while on the
job. His job included manual clean-up work involving sweep-
1 486 P.2d 712 (Okla. 1971).
2Larson, The "Heart Cases in Workmen's Compensation: An
Analysis and Suggested Solution", 65 MICH. L. RFv. 441
(1967).
8 Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Miller, 451 P.2d 932 (Okla. 1968);
Marr v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 443 P.2d 961 (Okla.
1968); Melrose v. Oklahoma College for Women, 393 P.2d
878 (Okla. 1964).
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ing and shoveling. On the day he experienced the chest pain,
he had performed no duties outside of his normal routine. The
deceased began the day in good health. The evidence before
the Industrial Court indicated no unusual exertion, and the
Supreme Court held that in the absence of any showing of un-
usual strain or exertion beyond that encountered normally, no
causal connection was possible and therefore the award must
be vacated.
Compensability of heart attack cases under the Oklahoma
Workmen's Compensation Act4 creates two specific problems,
both of which arise from language embodied in the act.5 These
problems concern the statutory requirements that the injury
be both one that is accidental and one that arises out of the
employment. The usual exertion rule has often been applied
for the purpose of satisfying both of these requirements.0
However, in Ideal Cement the court utilized only the second
of these requirements to render the rule inapplicable in Okla-
homa,7 and for this reason it is only this aspect of the statu-
tory requirement that will be pursued here.
The requirement that the injury, to be compensable, must
arise out of the employment, deals with the idea that there
must exist some causal connection between the injury incur-
red and the work being performed. The employment must
4 OKLA. STAT. fit. 85, §§ 1 to 176 (1971).
5 OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 11 (1971), which provides that:
Every employer . . . shall pay, or provide as re-
quired by this Act, compensation according to the
schedules of this article for the disability or death
of his employee resulting from an accidental per-
sonal injury sustained by the employee arising out
of and in the course of his employment, without
regard to fault as a cause of such injury ....
6 Farmer's Co-Op Exchange v. Krewall, 450 P.2d 506 (Okla.
1969); Bill Gover Ford Co. v. Roniger, 426 P.2d 701 (Okla.
1967); H. J. Jeffries Truck Line v. Grisham, 397 P.2d 637
(Okla. 1964).
7 486 P.2d at 715.
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be a precipitating cause of the injury. Because of the diffi-
culty in actually determining the cause of cardiac failure, this
requirement causes obvious problems in the area of heart at-
tack claims. Due to this difficulty in determining causation,
a number of Oklahoma decisions in this area apparently re-
quired that in the case of claimants whose claims arose as a
result of cardiac injury, some showing of unusual exertion
or strain was necessary before compensation would be allow-
ed, the irregularity of the work performed being the element
satisfying the requirement of causal connection.8 However, in
1961, with the decision in the Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Orum,9
the Oklahoma Supreme Court announced the first clear ac-
ceptance of the usual exertion rule in the area of cardiac in-
jury by allowing compensation to the widow of a coal miner
who had died of a heart attack while doing routine work in
an ordinary fashion. No unusual exertion existed under the
facts of Ben Hur Coal, and none was required, the court adopt-
ing the reasoning that the question of causation was one of
fact for the determination of the State Industrial Court sitting
en banc, considering lay and expert testimony concerning the
work actually being done by the employee at the time of the
injury. No showing of unusual exertion or irregular work-
ing conditions was required, and the court quoted approving-
ly from the case of Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Siohons,10 which
held, in regard to a claim under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act for a shoulder injury, that clearly no unusual strain
or exertion need be proven for an injury to be compensable.
The Ben Hur Coal court applied this same rationale to the
area of cardiac claims. The holding of the court in the Ben
Hur Coal case has been followed almost without exception
8 Berryhill v. Prudential Premium Co., 394 P.2d 520 (Okla.
1964); Ada Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Snead, 364 P.2d 625
(Okla. 1961); Glaspey v. Dickerson, 350 P.2d 939 (Okla.
1960); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Kincannon, 203 Okla. 95, 218 P.2d
625 (1950); Carden Mining & Milling Co. v. Yost, 193 Okla.
423, 144 P.2d 969 (1943).
0 366 P.2d 919 (Okla. 1961).
10 331 P.2d 934 (Okla. 1958).
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in the cardiac area until the June, 1971, decision in Ideal Ce-
ment. Numerous cases during this period allowed compensa-
tion under facts involving no unusual strain or exertion and
specifically stated that none was required." In the 1968 case
of Flint Constr. Co. v. Downum, 2 the court clearly laid down
the accepted rule in Oklahoma at that time by holding that:
This court is definitely committed to the rule
that a disability attributable to a heart condition caus-
ed or precipitated by an antecedent strain or exertion
occurring while the employee is doing his work in the
usual and customary manner as an employee coming
within the provisions of the Oklahoma Workmen's
Compensation Act is compensable although nothing
unusual occurred to cause the strain or exertion.8
As late as September, 1970, in the case of King v. Honegger
Constr. Co.,1 4 the court apparently reiterated its acceptance
of the usual exertion rule by allowing death benefits to the
widow of an employee, even though the deceased worker was
not doing work involving unusual strain or exertion. Although
there are a few recent decisions in Oklahoma rejecting or at
least choosing not to utilize the rule in what would seem to
be applicable situations, 5 these may be explained by the
11 King v. Honegger Constr. Co., 476 P.2d 72 (Okla. 1970);
Farmer's Co-Op Exchange v. Krewall, 450 P.2d 506 (Okla.
1969); Flint Constr. Co. v. Downum, 444 P.2d 200 (Okla.
1968); Fisher v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 440 P.2d 708 (Okla.
1968); Bill Gover Ford Co. v. Roniger, 426 P.2d 701 (Okla.,
1967); H. J. Jeffries Truck Line v. Grisham, 397 P.2d 637
(Okla. 1964); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Evans, 376 P.2d 336
(Okla. 1962); Co-Operative Publishing Co. v. Jestes, 373
P.2d 33 (Okla. 1962).
12 444 P.2d 200 (Okla. 1968).
18 Id. at 203.
14 476 P.2d 72 (Okla. 1970).
15 Berryhill v. Prudential Premium Co., 394 P.2d 520 (Okla.
1964); Ada Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Snead, 364 P.2d 696
(Okla. 1961); Glaspey v. Dickerson, 350 P.2d 939 (Okla.'
1960). For a possible explanation of these inconsistencies,
[Vol. 8, No. 2
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Supreme Court's limited jurisdiction for review of workmen's
compensation cases, that review being restricted to purely
legal questions. The court has been hesitant to overturn the
Industrial Court on the question of causation due to the fact
that causation is correctly a determination of fact for the In-
dustrial Court.' 6 These cases clearly appear to be exceptions
to the weight of authority in this state giving support to the
rule.17
In Ideal Cement, the court emphatically rejected this au-
thority by first observing that the majority of recent decisions
concerning this problem, although voicing acceptance of the
rule, factually involved unusual strain or exertion, 8 the court
suggesting that a trend toward this position had developed
through these earlier decisions. The court goes on to cite the
case of Kinser v. Western Sands, Inc.19 to support the proposi-
tion that: "When the evidence reflects that the deceased at
the time he sustained a heart attack was doing exactly the
same type of work he normally does, and was not subjected
to any unusual strain or exertion, there is no causal connec-
tion between the heart attack and the work."20 Kinser, there-
see 1A A. LARSON, WoPmi-s's ComENsATmoN LAW 559
(1967), which states that:
[C]ourts suddenly seem to become worried about
the almost unlimited range of heart cases they
might be bringing within the Act and as a result
produce an occasional restrictive decision difficult
to reconcile with the main line of cases.
16 King v. Honegger Constr. Co., 476 P.2d 72 (Okla. 1970);
Flint Constr. Co. v. Downum, 444 P.2d 200 (Okla. 1968);
Fisher v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 440 P.2d 708 (Okla. 1968).
17 See Derryberry & Selph, Workmen's Compensation: Recov-
ery for Heart Attack-Waiver Needed, 22 OKA. L. Rv.
345 (1969) for a full discussion of Oklahoma's acceptance
of the usual exertion rule.
18 486 P.2d at 715.
10 454 P.2d 305 (Okla. 1969).
20 486 P.2d at 715.
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fore appears to be the vehicle used by the court in Ideal Ce-
ment to overturn the usual exertion rule. Utilization of Kinser
for this purpose, however, somewhat confuses the court's de-
cision in Ideal Cement. In Kinser the Supreme Court merely
affirmed the State Industrial Court's determination of fact
that there was no causal connection between the death by
heart failure of a motel manager and his duties in that posi-
tion. It is not clear, however, whether the Industrial Court
based its holding on a lack of causal connection between the
work and the heart injury or whether it based its finding
on the claimant's failure to prove unusual exertion. The ques-
tion in issue before the Supreme Court was whether or not
the Industrial Court could render a decision without specify-
ing the factual determination made in reaching that decision.21
Even though the facts of the case evidence no unusual strain,
the Industrial Court might consistently have rejected causal
connection while accepting the usual exertion rule by holding
that there was no causal connection betweqn the usual em-
ployment of the deceased and the injury. For this reason, use
of the Kinser decision to support the position taken by the
court in Ideal Cement is of questionable merit. A reading of
the entire opinion in Ideal Cement, however, supports the
conclusion that the court is firmly rejecting the use in Okla-
homa of the usual exertion rule and that in all future cases
in this area, in order to show causal connection between the
employment and the injury incurred, as is required under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, some evidence of unusual
strain or exertion will be required before compensation will
be allowed.
The position of the court in Ideal Cement puts Oklahoma
in a minority of jurisdictions throughout the country that do
not endorse the rule.22 It should be noted that at least one
state has created an unusual exertion requirement by statute, s
21 454 P.2d at 307.
22 1A A. LARsoN, supra note 15, at 541-42.
[Vol. 8, No. 2,
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the administration of which has forced that state to deal with
the problems resulting from this position, such as the prob-
lem of defining unusual exertion and the problem of t h e
quantum of proof necessary to establish it. Oklahoma's ap-
proach to these problems will be determined by future litiga-
tion in this area. It is clear, however, that Ideal Cement is a
narrowing of the coverage of the Oklahoma Workmen's Com-
pensation Act and will preclude a large number of awards
for injury in the heart attack area. It remains to be seen
whether or not the court's decision in Ideal Cement will create
a binding precedent in this state or will merely become an-
other of the infrequent exceptions to endorsement of the rule
to be found among the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma in the cardiac area. However, it appears from the
unequivocal language used by the court in Ideal Cement that
the decision is one that will have long lasting effect on work-
men's compensation coverage of heart cases in Oklahoma.
Robert C. Butler Jr.
2 A. STAT. ANN. ch. 44, § 501 (Supp. 1970), amending KA".
STAT. ANN. ch. 44, § 501 (1963). See also Kelly, The Usual-
Exertion Requirement and Employment-Connected Heart
Attacks, 16 KAN. L. REV. 411 (1967). For other legislative
treatment, see NEv. REv. STAT. § 616.110 (1951) which com-
pletely precludes recovery for heart connected injury.
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